The mechanism of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on enterprise technological innovation: the moderation effect of the nature of property rights
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2022
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2565
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
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(2022). The mechanism of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on enterprise technological innovation: the moderation effect of the nature of property rights. Retrieved from: https://repository.nida.ac.th/handle/662723737/6484.
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The mechanism of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on enterprise technological innovation: the moderation effect of the nature of property rights
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Abstract
At present, China is moving towards an era of innovation driven development, and the dominant position of enterprise technology innovation is becoming increasingly prominent and important. Fiscal decentralization will affect the distribution of attention and efforts of local governments among multi task types, and affect the technological innovation of enterprises in their jurisdictions through local governments. It is an important institutional constraint on technological innovation of enterprises. However, the current research on the economic consequences of fiscal decentralization mainly focuses on the macro level, and does not include the impact of fiscal decentralization on enterprises, an important micro market subject, into the analytical framework. Any enterprise is embedded in a specific institutional environment. This study comprehensively uses the fiscal decentralization theory, the multi task principal-agent theory, the government intervention theory and the property rights theory to build a theoretical model of fiscal decentralization on the technological innovation behavior of micro enterprises in the three-tier principal agent analysis framework of the central government, local government and enterprises, which enriches the research prospect of enterprise technological innovation. This model focuses on depicting the intermediary mechanism between fiscal decentralization and enterprise technology innovation of local government innovation preference, namely fiscal decentralization (central local relationship) – local government innovation preference (local government behavior) – enterprise technology innovation (enterprise behavior). In addition, the model further introduces the nature of property rights (state-owned and private) as an adjusting variable to study the difference of intermediary effect of local government innovation preference in enterprises with different property rights.
This paper takes A-share listed companies that were listed before the end of 2012 and regularly published annual financial reports between 2012 and 2020 as samples, and uses multiple regression method to empirically test the theoretical model. The empirical results show that: 1) Fiscal decentralization has a significant inhibitory effect on technological innovation of enterprises, which provides empirical evidence for the “decentralization inhibition theory” from the micro level. 2) Local government innovation preference has a significant negative intermediary effect between fiscal decentralization and technological innovation of enterprises. By increasing the relative incentive intensity of technological innovation, the central government has corrected the distortion of local governments' attention and effort level, and promoted them to change from “competition for growth” to “competition for innovation” However, the local government's mastery of innovation resources has led to the emergence of policy arbitrage, which has formed a “crowding out effect” on technological innovation of enterprises. 3) State owned property rights have significantly weakened the mediation effect of local governments' innovation preferences. As the core institutional arrangement of the socialist market economy system, state-owned enterprises have the advantages of both market and government economic coordination methods, and are more helpful than private enterprises in curbing or even eliminating the negative impact of local government innovation preferences on technological innovation of enterprise. The above empirical results provide evidence support for improving the technological innovation capability of enterprises from the perspective of improving the fiscal decentralization system and strengthening the reform of enterprise property rights system.
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Thesis (Ph.D. (Management))--National Institute of Development Administration, 2022