The bargaining power in mergersand and acquisitions and its linkage to premiums
Files
Issued Date
2017
Issued Date (B.E.)
2560
Available Date
Copyright Date
Resource Type
Series
Edition
Language
eng
File Type
application/pdf
No. of Pages/File Size
133 leaves
ISBN
ISSN
eISSN
Other identifier(s)
b201173
Identifier(s)
Access Rights
Access Status
Rights
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Rights Holder(s)
Physical Location
National Institute of Development Administration. Library and Information Center
Bibliographic Citation
Citation
Puvanard Hemvichitr (2017). The bargaining power in mergersand and acquisitions and its linkage to premiums. Retrieved from: https://repository.nida.ac.th/handle/662723737/5871.
Title
The bargaining power in mergersand and acquisitions and its linkage to premiums
Alternative Title(s)
Author(s)
Advisor(s)
Editor(s)
item.page.dc.contrubutor.advisor
Advisor's email
Contributor(s)
Contributor(s)
Abstract
Bidders with high premiums will face a ‘winner’s curse’ dilemma, as a result
reducing the subsequent synergy created through acquisition, while bidders with low
premiums paid may result in a more profitable way after acquisition. Bargaining is an
important aspect in negotiating beneficial terms and conditions. The bargaining power
contributes to target’s and acquirer’s characteristics to bargain each other on the
premium paid in acquisitions. Therefore, bargaining power in mergers and
acquisitions provides some useful implications on how negotiations in the bargaining
process could affect the market for corporate control.
This research mainly focuses on the bargaining power in mergers and acquisitions and its effect on premium in the bargaining process before mergers and acquisitions occur. We want to see what variables would have significant impact on premiums based on the bargaining power between targets and acquirers. The higher bargaining power party will have a better bargaining position versus its counterparty, thereby receiving a better payoff and outcome.
The objective of this research is to determine the premium paid in mergers and acquisitions by examining bargaining characteristics between targets and acquirers in various ways. Most of the previous researches rarely explain the linkage between bargaining power and premium paid in acquisitions, rather focusing on the postacquisition performance. The test of bargaining in acquisition at least provides some critical implications to managers, investors, investment bankers, fund managers or even policy makers in understanding the M&A bargaining situations.
Understanding the bargaining power in mergers and acquisitions is crucial. The findings of this research are useful for various parties. Target managers and acquirer managers would understand whether they should accept, reject or renegotiate the terms and conditions due to their bargaining powers or not. Investors and fund managers may take advantage of the stock price movement due to the acquisition announcement whether the deals are purchased at relatively low price level or not. Investment bankers would be able to evaluate the premium paid in acquisition more accurately. Also, policy makers may be able to specify the rules and regulations in mergers and acquisition deals.
This research mainly focuses on the bargaining power in mergers and acquisitions and its effect on premium in the bargaining process before mergers and acquisitions occur. We want to see what variables would have significant impact on premiums based on the bargaining power between targets and acquirers. The higher bargaining power party will have a better bargaining position versus its counterparty, thereby receiving a better payoff and outcome.
The objective of this research is to determine the premium paid in mergers and acquisitions by examining bargaining characteristics between targets and acquirers in various ways. Most of the previous researches rarely explain the linkage between bargaining power and premium paid in acquisitions, rather focusing on the postacquisition performance. The test of bargaining in acquisition at least provides some critical implications to managers, investors, investment bankers, fund managers or even policy makers in understanding the M&A bargaining situations.
Understanding the bargaining power in mergers and acquisitions is crucial. The findings of this research are useful for various parties. Target managers and acquirer managers would understand whether they should accept, reject or renegotiate the terms and conditions due to their bargaining powers or not. Investors and fund managers may take advantage of the stock price movement due to the acquisition announcement whether the deals are purchased at relatively low price level or not. Investment bankers would be able to evaluate the premium paid in acquisition more accurately. Also, policy makers may be able to specify the rules and regulations in mergers and acquisition deals.
Table of contents
Description
Thesis (Ph.D. (Business Administration))--National Institute of Development Administration, 2017