Intergovernmental transfer in Thailand : a test of horizontal equity
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2015
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2558
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313 leaves
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b191182
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
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National Institute of Development Administration. Library and Information Center
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Darunee Pumkaew (2015). Intergovernmental transfer in Thailand : a test of horizontal equity. Retrieved from: https://repository.nida.ac.th/handle/662723737/6254.
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Intergovernmental transfer in Thailand : a test of horizontal equity
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Abstract
This research proved the existing fiscal equality of the intergovernmental grant
allocation. The research objectives were 1) to investigate the intergovernmental
transfer in Thailand and to test the hypothesis on horizontal fiscal balance among the
local governments, 2) to conduct a qualitative study with an emphasis on general
grant and specific grant allocation in order to strengthen the horizontal fiscal balance,
and 3) to provide recommendations to policymakers and concerned parties on the
ement of grant allocation. The mixed method was used to inves
horizontal equalization at all local government levels, especially the lower-tier,
throughout the country. The units of analysis were Provincial Administrative
Organizations (PAOs), Municipalities, and Subdistrict Administrative Organizations
(SAOs). Data were collected for a period of four fiscal years from 2009 to 2012, and
were based on the records of the Department of Local Administration under the
Ministry of Interior. The general grant was the main variable because it is used to fix
local government fiscal imbalances which supplement inadequate local own-source
revenues in order to enhance the ability of local governments to meet their
expenditure responsibilities.
The results confirmed the following 1) General grant allocation was not
inverse with local government revenue; in other words, general grant was not
delivered to local government with lower revenue capacity. 2) The inequality still
remained in local administrative organizations; the disparity was declined only 0.04
er general grant allocation. 3) Allocation created more fiscal inequality among
some types of local administrative organizations, and among some regions. 4) In term
of the highest fiscal inequality, by types of local administrative organization and by
region, it was Sub-district municipalities, and the East respectively. 5) The measure of
specific grant allocation created more fiscal inequality. The different methods or
channels, either regular or irregular, to obtain special grant allocation, resulted in
fiscal inequality. The impacts of grant allocation are the limiting of fiscal autonomy of
local governments, unpredictable budget, not narrowing fiscal gaps, and motivating
pork barrel as the discretion on (specific) grant allocation. Recommendations for the
reduction of fiscal disparities were 1) to develop an equalization transfer-formula,
2)to reduce some specific grant projects, and 3) to improve the institutional arrangement
for fiscal transfers.
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Thesis (Ph.D. (Development Admininstration))--National Institute of Development Administration, 2015